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Abstract 
Using Google Trends data to identify hostile sexism, we find that sexism explains about 8 cents 
(or 41 percent) of the residual gender wage gap, the wage gap after controlling for education, 
occupation, industry, and age.  We find evidence for a direct effect of sexism consistent with 
labor market discrimination and an indirect effect that works through social outcomes that reduce 
hours worked which itself directly affects wages. Consistent with theories of discrimination, the 
direct impact of sexism is greater for women who are less educated, work in less competitive 
industries, and work in industries with fewer female workers. 
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1 Introduction 
We exploit geographic variation in both hostile sexism and the gender wage gap and find that 
sexism has both a direct and indirect effect on the gender wage gap.  Hostile sexism invokes 
explicitly negative beliefs about women; overall, we find that about 41 percent of the gender 
wage gap between white men and women that exists after controlling for education, occupation, 
industry, and age can be explained by it.  The direct effect of sexism accounts for about 29 
percent of the wage gap and is consistent with labor market discrimination:  the wage gap 
between white men and white women with the same education, age, industry, and occupation is 
larger in geographic areas that exhibit more sexism.  We also find corroborating evidence that 
sexism is related to discrimination by finding larger impacts in circumstances in which 
discrimination would be less costly.   
However, there is also a nontrivial indirect impact because sexism can influence the non-
labor market choices of women, such as marriage and having children.  These social outcomes 
are significant determinants of labor market outcomes as well, especially the number of hours 
worked outside the home.  By instrumenting for both sexism and social outcomes in a 
simultaneous equation model using GMM, we show a causal role for both the direct and indirect 
effects of sexism on wages.  The evidence from these simultaneous equation models suggests 
multiple ways in which sexism affects the gender wage gap:  It affects it directly as well as 
indirectly via social outcomes which then influence hours worked and hourly wages. 
Importantly, our results hold when controlling for a large number of characteristics and a broad 
set of fixed effects. Previous studies do find some evidence suggesting the relevance of sexism in 
determining the gender wage gap, but the evidence thus far has been correlational and context-
specific (Charles et al., 2009, 2018; Janssen et al., 2016). 
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Our work uses a novel measure of sexism constructed from Google Trends data.  Google 
data provides several advantages over previous measures, constructed exclusively with the 
General Social Survey (GSS) (Charles et al., 2009, 2018). First, it identifies sexism at the media 
market level, providing a larger sample size compared to studies that examine labor market 
outcomes of women at the state level.1 Second, it is based on searches that occur mostly in 
private. In contrast, the GSS collects data with face-to-face interviews, a method that may 
understate an individual’s sexism due to social censoring (Bound et al., 2001; Wright, 1993; 
Tourangeau and Yan, 2007; Berinsky, 1999, 2002).   
The direct impact of sexism on the wage gap is suggestive of discrimination and we 
present several findings consistent with this interpretation.  The seminal work of Becker (1971) 
predicts that sexism may decrease a woman’s relative wage by causing disutility among 
employers, co-workers, or customers who interact with women.  However, discrimination could 
be less prevalent in competitive markets because employers who choose to pay to discriminate 
may be driven out.  For example, Janssen et al. (2016) use data from Swiss referenda to assess 
discriminatory attitudes towards women and correlate them with the gender wage gap, finding 
that it has a larger impact in the high-concentration manufacturing industry.  Similarly, Hirsch et 
al. (2010) use data at the worker-firm level and find that the gender wage gap is larger in German 
firms with greater monopsony power.  Blau and Khan (2017) review several papers that also find 
evidence suggestive of wage discrimination against women that point to various market 
imperfections that allow it to occur. 
                                                          
1 A media market is a collection of counties identified by Nielsen Media Research that receive 
the same television broadcasting.  It may be similar, but not identical, to a commuting zone or 
MSA.  There are currently 384 MSAs in the U.S. and 210 media markets.  We use this as a unit 
of analysis because Google search data is aggregated in this way. 
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Consistent with the idea that the extent of discrimination that occurs is influenced by its 
economic costs and benefits, we find that sexism has a greater impact in less competitive 
industries, in less competitive labor markets, in industries in which workers are more likely to 
directly interact with customers, and in industries with a smaller share of female workers. 
Finally, we show that sexism negatively affects the wages of women in a geographic area and 
somewhat weaker evidence suggesting it increases the wages of men. 
We argue that the indirect impact of sexism works through its promotion of social 
outcomes that negatively influence hours worked outside the home and female wages. Akerlof 
and Kranton (2000) predict that utility from social outcomes depends on the extent an outcome is 
consistent with identity. Norms in more sexist areas may reinforce a more traditional female 
identity and women in these areas may feel compelled to pursue social outcomes traditionally 
associated with being female. Consistent with this idea, we use an instrumental variables strategy 
to find that in more sexist areas, women are more likely to marry, have children, and spend more 
time at home.  
In finding causal evidence for the role of sexism in determining social outcomes that 
influence the wage gap, we link two separate strands in the literature.  One strand finds evidence 
that marital status, children, and home hours contribute to a wider wage gap.  For example, 
Hersch and Stratton (2002) find that married women who spend more time doing housework 
have lower wages.  Similarly, Lundberg and Rose (2000) show that married women who have 
their labor supply interrupted by childbirth earn lower wages.2  A second strand of related 
literature finds evidence that these outcomes are influenced by norms and attitudes.  For 
                                                          
2 See also Hersch and Stratton (1997), Korenman and Neumark (1992), and Becker (1985). 
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example, Bertrand et al. (2015) establish that gender identity within a household influences 
marriage formation, the wife’s labor force participation, and the division of labor within the 
household.  In a similar finding, Fernandez and Fogli (2009) find that for second-generation 
American women the culture of their ancestors influences their fertility and labor force 
participation.  Other authors who have studied a link between culture and social outcomes that 
could influence labor force behavior include Alesina et al., 2013; Carlana, 2019; and Bursztyn et 
al., 2017. Our work merges these two approaches by finding evidence for the indirect impact of 
sexism on the wage gap via social outcomes. 
Because we exploit geographic variation in the wage gap, social outcomes, and sexism 
within the U.S. to obtain our results, our work is most closely related to the strand of the 
literature that examines how social and economic outcomes of women vary geographically 
within the U.S.  Many have studied the evolution of social and economic outcomes of women 
through time (e.g., Bailey et al., 2014; Hsieh et al., 2019; Black and Spitz-Oener, 2010).  In 
contrast, relatively few examine how social and economic outcomes of women vary 
geographically within the U.S.   Beaudry and Lewis (2014) study the change in the gender wage 
gap over the 1980 – 2000 time period using cross-city differences, attributing a decline in the 
wage gap over this time period to the adoption of computers.  Black et al. (2014) explain the 
cross-city difference in the labor supply of married women with variation in commuting times.  
The work most closely related to ours is Charles et al. (2018) who study sexism, the 
gender wage gap, and social outcomes of women across states, measuring attitudes about women 
with survey responses from the General Social Survey (GSS).   However, we approach the same 
issue with a different method for measuring sexism that relies on Google search data.  This 
allows us to study sexism and the wage gap in a smaller geographic area than a state.  This is 
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appealing intuitively because a media market more closely resembles a local labor market than a 
state.  A media market is a collection of counties identified by Nielsen Media Research that 
receives the same television broadcasting.  Especially in large states, there can be significant 
variation in wage gaps and culture across media markets in the same state.  For example, in 
Odessa, TX, we estimate that the average woman with the same education, occupation, and 
industry earns 76 cents for every dollar the average man earns.  In Austin, the average woman 
earns 82 cents for every dollar earned by a comparable man.  By measuring sexism in a different 
way in smaller geographic areas, we are able to obtain more robust results and evidence of 
causality.   
We proceed by first explaining the construction of the measures of sexism and the wage 
gap in Section 2.  Section 3 explains our methods and Section 4 presents results for the direct 
effect of sexism on the wage gap.  We then move on to exploring the indirect effects of sexism 
on the wage gap via social outcomes in Section 5 and discuss the determination of male and 
female wages as well as alternative explanations in Section 6 before offering a conclusion in 
Section 7. 
2 Measuring Sexism and the Wage Gap 
Our general approach is to explore the role that sexism plays in explaining the variation in the 
gender wage gap across different geographic areas in the U.S.  To do so, we develop a measure 
of sexism and the wage gap at the same geographic level.  In this section, we explain the 
procedures for developing these measures. 
2.1 Measuring Sexism 
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Note: The following sections describe offensive language. We refer to these words using coded 
language, shown in Appendix A. 
Constructing a Sexism Dictionary 
We focus exclusively on hostile sexism.  Hostile sexism, identified by Glick and Fiske (1996, 
1997), involves explicitly negative attitudes about women. It reflects beliefs that women are 
inferior to men in both competence and character. In contrast, benevolent sexism is more 
paternalistic and can even idealize women.3  To capture how hostile sexism is expressed in 
language, we rely on Hall and Bucholtz (2012). They identify three themes that are reflected in 
most expressions of sexism: 1) women as sexual objects, 2) women as dumb and emotional, and 
3) women as rude and evil.  Throughout this paper, unless otherwise noted, we use the terms 
“sexism” and “hostile sexism” interchangeably.  Although our focus on hostility towards women 
may cause us to underestimate the sexism of an area, an advantage of this approach is that there 
is less ambiguity in identifying words or phrases that clearly objectify or demean women, and we 
are less likely to identify trends that are related to other cultural attitudes or beliefs.4 
Because sexism is multidimensional, it is difficult to capture it with only one word or 
phrase.5   As a result, we proceed by constructing a sexism dictionary; we use Hall and 
Bucholtz’s (2012) three themes to serve as the basis for this exercise. Their list of 112 sexist 
                                                          
3 Charles et al. (2009, 2018) construct a measure of sexism that focuses on beliefs about the role 
of women in society. In contrast, our measure of sexism only captures negative and demeaning 
attitudes.  
4 For example, religion may be intertwined with benevolent sexism in a complicated way. 
5 Stephens-Davidowitz (2014) is able to effectively capture racism with searches for one word 
and variants of it. 
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phrases provide a starting point for our dictionary.6 Because their list includes regional slang and 
phrases with multiple meanings, we employ a filtering procedure. First, we select any clearly-
sexist phrases, adding them to our dictionary (words 1-4, Table 1). Then, we employ a 
rudimentary search tree algorithm from Owen and Wei (2020). The algorithm enters each of Hall 
and Bucholtz’s (2012) 112 phrases into thesaurus.com, adding any sexist phrases that appear in 
the results. By repeating this process for new phrases we find until no more sexist words come 
up in the results, we build a tree of related words for each entry in the original list of 112 phrases. 
We conclude our search with an expanded list of 266 sexist phrases. 
The next step of the procedure extracts how people express sexism on Google. We enter 
the expanded list of 266 words into Google Correlate, identifying the 100 most correlated queries 
for each word at the state level. This step gives a list of 15,460 potentially sexist queries made by 
Google users. To extract queries referring specifically to females, we filter this list by the 
keywords “girl(s)” and “woman(en)”. We identify any negative adjectives that are used to refer 
to females, finding six: “fat”, “ugly”, “stupid”, “dumb”, “emotional”, and “cheating”. We 
construct the final dictionary by generating all possible permutations between these six 
adjectives and the four words: “girl”, “girls”, “woman”, and “women.” Table 1 shows the final 
dictionary. It includes 16 phrases, representing all three themes from Hall and Bucholtz (2012). 
The sexism dictionary includes phrases that users search frequently. The most frequently 
searched word, “[word 2](es)”, has a search volume of over 130,000 per month. This, for 
context, is about 7 times more than searches for “[word 5](s)”, 2.8 times more than searches for 
                                                          
6 Hall and Bucholtz (2012) construct a list of 112 sexist phrases by surveying a diverse sample 
of 365 Berkeley undergraduate students over the 1991-1992 period, asking each student to 
provide 10 expressions of sexism. 
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“Economics”, and about equal to searches for “Sweater.”7 Frequency analysis on top searches 
indicates that phrases in our dictionary are often used to find sexist material.8  The most popular 
topics are “lyrics”, followed by “meme”, “song”, and “pictures.” A cursory search on Google 
shows that these topics, used in conjunction with our dictionary, returns sexist content. For 
example, the second result of “[word 3] lyrics” is about the desire to sexually exploit an 
attractive woman. The first result of “[word 2](es) meme” is a website of GIFs that objectify 
women. Women as objects is one of the three themes of hostile sexism identified by Hall and 
Bucholz (2012). 
The Sexism Index 
We use Google Trends to obtain the relative search volume of phrases in our sexism dictionary 
over the 2004-2019 time period, apply principal components analysis to these search volumes, 
and generate Sexism Index, a variable that is normalized so that it has a mean of zero and 
standard deviation of one.  The final variable measures the number of standard deviations an 
area’s sexist search volume is form the mean. Additional technical details are in Appendix A.    
Sexism Index assigns weight in an intuitive manner. Ranking phrases in the sexism 
dictionary by their correlation to Sexism Index reveals which phrases receive the heaviest weight. 
Four of the five most correlated phrases— “ugly woman(en)”, “[word 4](s)”, “cheating girl(s)”, 
“[word 3](s)”, and “fat girl(s)”—all portray women as objects, suggesting that the first theme in 
Hall and Bucholtz (2012) receives the heaviest weight. An important point is that Sexism Index 
                                                          
7 A potential concern is that a few of our words have low search volumes below 1,000 per 
month. We show that our results are robust to dropping these words from the dictionary. 
8 To perform frequency analysis, we scrape the top searches of each word in our sexism 
dictionary, obtaining a list of 330 queries. From the list, we manually remove spurious entries 
and words in our sexism dictionary. We rank the remaining words by the frequency a word 
appears across all queries. 
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varies widely by geography: The least sexist media markets are San Francisco and Portland; the 
most are Myrtle Beach and Columbus. For example, the level of sexism we identify in Myrtle 
Beach is 3.04 standard deviations above the mean, while the level of sexism in San Francisco is 
4.41 standard deviations below the mean.  
To further explore the interpretation of the index, we correlate its average over 2004-
2015 with responses to two questions asked in the 2016 American National Election Studies 
(ANES) survey.  The first question is, “Do women often consider innocent remarks sexist?” and 
the second question is, “Do women often fail to appreciate what men do for them?”  Affirmative 
responses to both of these questions indicate a negative evaluation of women.  We use this 
survey data to construct a measure of sexist attitudes at the state level and recalculate the Sexism 
Index at the state level for comparison.  We find a positive correlation either using the average 
response to the questions or by using a ranking of the states based on the average score (See 
Figure 1).9  Although low numbers of respondents in some media markets prohibits us from 
using the ANES data in our analysis, the positive correlation between these survey responses and 
Sexism Index provides some validation that the index we created is capturing sexist attitudes.   
2.2 Constructing Wage Gaps 
Our main dependent variable is the residual gender wage gap of a media market. The raw gender 
wage gap is defined as the average log wage of men minus the average log wage of women. We 
calculate a residual wage gap by estimating this raw wage gap while controlling for age, 
occupation, industry, and education as described in this section. 
                                                          
9 Specifically, we code the survey responses so that higher values indicate stronger sexist 
attitudes and then normalize the results by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard 
deviation. 
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To calculate the wage gap in a geographic area, we start with individual level data from 
the American Community Survey (ACS).  We impose several sample restrictions on the ACS 
data to avoid conflating issues with race, age, and employment: we restrict the sample to whites 
between the ages of 25 and 64 who are wage earners, but not self-employed.  We do not restrict 
our analysis to only full-time, year-round workers to allow us to consider the ways in which 
sexism and social outcomes might affect this aspect of labor force attachment.  However, 95% of 
the individuals in our data work more than 46 weeks/year and 93% work 30 or more hours/week.  
Although we do not report these results in detail, we find that our conclusions are robust to 
focusing on full-time (> 30 hours/week), year-round workers.10  We use the log of real hourly 
wages in our estimations which are defined as the log of annual wage and salary divided by the 
product between hours worked in a week and weeks worked in a year, deflated by the CPI.11   
To construct the wage gap at the media market level, we estimate an OLS regression of 
the form 
(1)                                             ln𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 =  𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚 + 𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓 + 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 + 𝜑𝜑 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, 
where the dependent variable is the log hourly wage of individual i. 𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚 and 𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓 are a set of male 
and female indicators for each media market, 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 is a set of year fixed effects, and 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 is a vector of 
individual characteristics that capture an individual’s age, occupation, education, and industry.12 
                                                          
10 Any results discussed in the text but not reported are available from the authors upon request. 
11 For some years, the ACS lacks a continuous variable for weeks worked in a year. We impute 
weeks worked using the midpoint of the categorical variable for these years. We only use the top 
two categories: “worked 50-52 weeks” and “worked 48-50 week”. The other categories span a 
longer set of weeks, making imputation less accurate. 
12 Specifically, 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 includes Age quartic, Schooling FE, Industry FE, and Occupation Type FE. 
Appendix B defines these variables in detail. These variables are common to the labor economics 
literature. We specify them in the most restrictive manner. It is possible that sexism influences 
some of these characteristics, leading us to underestimate the impact of sexism. 
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We construct the residual wage gap of media market d by calculating 𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚 −  𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓, the difference 
between the coefficients on the male and female indicators of media market d. Our wage gap 
compares the wages of men and women from the same media market. This makes it independent 
from media market characteristics that have an equal impact on male and female wage. 
In our main estimations, we pool annual data from the 2004 to 2019 ACS and use that in 
cross-sectional estimations.13 In some supplementary estimations, we also present results from 
panel data and construct a second wage gap that is time-variant and compares the wages of men 
and women who live in a media market in a specific year. It is constructed by entering the male 
and female media market fixed effects separately by year such that the wage gap of media 
market d and year t is defined as 𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 −  𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 .  We use the panel data to explore if our conclusions 
are subject to omitted variables, however, we do not use these data for our main results because 
examining annual changes in sexism and the wage gap will not allow us to identify the longer 
term effects of culture. 
Our main estimations rely on data from the American Community Survey (ACS).   An 
alternative source of wage data is the Current Population Survey (CPS). We choose to use the 
ACS because it provides two main advantages over the CPS. It provides more observations and it 
identifies an individual’s birthplace at the state level, which we use as part of our identification 
strategy described below. In results not reported, we obtain similar results with CPS data.    
  
                                                          
13 The average individual in the data earns $28.86 per hour, is 44 years old, and has 15 years of 
schooling. 
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2.3 Preliminary Data Patterns 
The wage gap varies considerably across geography (Figure 2).  Despite the considerable 
geographic variation, all wage gaps are positive and statistically significant. This implies that in 
every media market, the average man continues to earn more than the average woman with the 
same education, age, occupation, and industry. 
The magnitudes of the wage gaps are large. The mean wage ratio across all media 
markets during this 15-year time span is 80.09. This implies that in the average media market, 
women earn 80 cents for each dollar earned by men who are similar in education, age, 
occupation, and industry. 
 How do women fare in the media markets with the largest and smallest wage gaps? The 
media market with the largest wage gap is Lake Charles, Louisiana, where women earn 68 cents 
for each dollar earned by men.  The media market with the smallest wage gap is Gainesville, 
Florida, where women earn 86 cents for each dollar earned by men.  Appendix C provides more 
detail on the media markets with the largest and smallest wage gaps. 
3 Methods 
The first step of our estimation process is to obtain a residual wage gap and a measure of sexism 
by media market as described above.  In the second step, described below, we use that residual 
wage gap as the dependent variable and explore the ways in which sexism is related to it.   
We use four different estimation techniques in the second step: cross-sectional estimation, 
instrumental variables, simultaneous equations models, and panel estimation.  In this section, we 
explain the cross-sectional specification.  As we proceed through the analysis, we then explain 
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how we modify our initial approach to present more convincing evidence of a causal role for 
sexism in determining the wage gap. 
The first specification is a cross-sectional OLS regression of the form:  
(2)                 Wage Gap𝑑𝑑 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 Sexism Index 𝑑𝑑 + 𝛽𝛽2Social outcome𝑑𝑑 + 𝛿𝛿𝑍𝑍𝑑𝑑 + 𝜇𝜇𝑑𝑑. 
The dependent variable is the wage gap of media market d and the main explanatory variable is 
the Google-based 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑. The variable 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑 represents any one of the 
following three social outcomes: Women Married, Children, and Home Hours Gap.  Women 
Married is the proportion of white women between the ages of 25 and 64 that are currently 
married, Children is the proportion of white women between the ages of 25 and 40 with at least 
one child at home, and Home Hours Gap is the average weekly home hours (non-labor force 
hours) of white women between the ages of 25 and 64 minus the average weekly home hours of 
white men between the ages of 25 and 64. 
 The cross-sectional specification includes a vector of control variables, 𝑍𝑍𝑑𝑑. This vector 
includes 5 socioeconomic characteristics specific to each media market: %Employed, %Female 
Employed, LFP, Female LFP, and College Gap. %Employed is the proportion of white workers 
employed in a media market, %Female Employed is the proportion of white women currently 
employed, LFP is the labor force participation rate of whites, Female LFP is the labor force 
participation rate of white women, and College Gap is the proportion of white men with a 
college education minus the proportion of white women in that media market with a college 
education.  Arguably, some of our “control” variables might also be considered social outcomes, 
especially Female LFP and the College Gap.   We do not focus on these variables in our 
analysis, however, because we study the residual wage gap computed using only men and 
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women who earn wages and controlling for education of the individual.  This allows us to more 
directly compare to previous literature that attempts to close the wage gap with individual 
characteristics (Blau and Kahn, 2017).  All of the control variables are calculated using 
individuals who are between the ages of 25 and 64. 
 The errors of the cross-sectional specification are heteroscedastic due to our method of 
estimating wage gaps. As a result, in this specification and all additional estimations, we weight 
the regression by the inverse of the standard error of the wage gap and we make its standard 
errors robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and within-state error correlation. 
An advantage of the cross-sectional specification is that it allows us to study the impact 
of sexism over a long time period because we have estimated a residual wage gap (with year 
fixed effects) and the sexism of a media market over a 15-year period.14  The longer time frame 
is better suited to capture the influence of social outcomes like Women Married and Children 
that would not respond to contemporaneous changes in sexism. 
 In sum, in all of our estimation strategies, we estimate a residual wage gap for each media 
market and then use that estimate as the dependent variable in a second step of our estimation 
process.15  That second step may involve cross-sectional, IV, GMM, or panel data methods.  Our 
approach is similar to that employed by Charles and Guryan (2008) and Beaudry and Lewis 
(2014).  The approach allows us to focus on the appropriate unit of analysis, the wage gap for a 
geographic area.  An alternative way of proceeding would be to do a one-step estimation process 
                                                          
14 See also Charles and Guryan (2008) and Charles et al. (2018) for a similar long-term focus.  
15 The advantage to using the residual wage gap as the dependent variable is that it allows us to 
control for a large number of individual characteristics. If we used the raw wage gap instead, we 
would sacrifice many degrees of freedom when controlling for these characteristics in the main 
specification. 
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with the individual-level wage data and use the sexism of an individual’s place of residence as an 
independent variable.  However, if we estimated the main specification at the individual level, 
we would duplicate Sexism Index across individuals from the same area. We would 
underestimate the standard error of the impact of sexism, even if we clustered errors 
geographically.  That said, we confirm that our conclusions are robust to this alternative 
estimation procedure and provide individual level results in Appendix D. 
   
4 Direct Effect of Sexism on the Wage Gap 
4.1 Cross-sectional Estimates 
Table 3 reports the estimation results of Equation 2 using cross-sectional data.  Across all five 
specifications, a media market’s Sexism Index is a positive and significant predictor of its wage 
gap. At the bottom of Table 3, we provide an estimate of the cost of sexism in cents based on the 
results in each column.  In other words, this estimate is how much smaller the residual hourly 
wage gap would be if every media market had the lowest level of sexism.  For example, the 
results in Column 1 indicate that the residual wage gap would close by 3.15 cents if every media 
market had the lowest level of sexism. Controlling for female economic outcomes in the media 
market makes the impact of sexism slightly larger (Column 2), suggesting that the baseline 
specification underestimates the impact of sexism. 
In Columns 3 through 5 of Table 3, we add social outcomes as explanatory variables.  As 
expected, media markets with a larger percentage of women who are married (Column 3) and 
have children at home (Column 4) have larger gender wage gaps.  In addition, the greater the 
difference in home hours between men and women, the larger the wage gap (Column 5). The 
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results in Column 3 indicate that a 10 percentage point increase in the percent of women who are 
married increases the wage gap by 3.8 percent. Column 4 indicates that a 10 percentage point 
increase in the percent of women with a child increases the wage gap by 1.4 percent. Finally, 
Column 5 indicates that a 10 hour increase a woman’s relative home hours per week increases in 
the wage gap by 14.5 percent. 
Examining the magnitude of the coefficients on sexism in Columns 3 through 5 reveals 
that controlling for these social outcomes makes the impact of sexism smaller. T-tests for the 
difference of coefficients indicate that the decrease is statistically significant. For example, the 
bottom of Column 3 indicates that controlling for Women Married makes the impact of sexism 
47 percent smaller (p < 0.01), the bottom of Column 4 indicates that controlling for Children 
makes the impact of sexism 38 percent smaller (p < 0.05), and the bottom of Column 5 indicates 
that controlling for Home Hours Gap makes the impact of sexism 33 percent smaller (p < 0.01). 
Because the estimations in Table 3 control for a number of individual and media market 
characteristics that might affect productivity of women relative to men, one interpretation of the 
consistently significant correlation between sexism and the gender wage gap is discrimination.  
Although these results do not provide direct evidence on this, in Table 4, we present results that 
are consistent with the effect of sexism working through discrimination by examining differential 
effects of sexism for workers under different circumstances.  In these estimations, we estimate 
wage gaps separately for different groups of individuals in the same media market so each media 
market has more than one wage gap associated with it.   
For example, in Column 1 of Table 4, we estimate a residual wage gap for two groups of 
people in the same media market:  those with college educations and those without.  In other 
words, even though the residual wage gap is calculated controlling for the years of education of 
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individuals, this specification allows us to determine if there is a systematic difference in the way 
that sexism affects the residual wage gap for two groups:  those with college educations and 
those without.  The negative coefficient on the interaction term between Sexism Index and 
College Educated implies that the impact of sexism on the wage gap of college educated workers 
is smaller.  In fact, when we examine the net effect of sexism on the wage gap of college 
educated workers, we find that it is small and statistically insignificant.  In other words, our 
evidence suggests that sexism affects the wage gap for workers without college educations, but 
we find no evidence that it affects workers with college educations.  Given that workers with 
college educations are in a more competitive labor market, this would be consistent with 
discrimination by employers.  It occurs in the markets in which employers pay a lower price to 
discriminate. 
The estimations in Columns 2 and 3 also investigate differential circumstances for the 
role of sexism.  In Column 2, we present results that suggest that sexism has a larger effect on 
the wage gap in manufacturing and commerce industries.  This result is similar to that found in 
Janssen et al. (2016) who argue that discrimination is less costly in manufacturing because it is a 
less competitive industry and is more beneficial in commerce industries because they require 
more interactions between workers and customers who may be biased.16  The fact that sexism 
has a larger influence in the less competitive manufacturing industry is suggestive of 
discrimination by employers, but the greater impact of sexism in the commerce industries 
suggest that discrimination by customers is also at play. 
                                                          
16 Autor et al. (2020) calculate Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices for several different industries and 
find the manufacturing industry to be most concentrated. 
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An additional result consistent with discrimination by employers appears in Column 3 
where we show that in industries that have more women, sexism has a smaller effect on the wage 
gap.  This too is consistent with sexism generating discriminatory behavior when discrimination 
is less costly.  Black (1995) predicts that increases in gender diversity decrease the part of the 
gender wage gap attributable to discrimination.  A larger fraction of women in the labor force 
increases the cost of discrimination caused by sexism because it requires even higher wages paid 
to men, who are relatively scarce.  This would drive discriminators out of the market.  These 
results are also consistent with discrimination by employers.   
Finally, in the last column in Table 4, we present evidence that explores an interaction 
between race and sexism.  Although in our main results we focus on the gender wage gap among 
white workers, we are also able to calculate a residual gender wage gap among Black workers.  
When we combine that with the wage gaps in each media market for white workers and estimate 
the impact of sexism for each race, we find that sexism widens the gender wage gap even more 
for Black workers than white.17  This is shown in the positive coefficient on the interaction of 
Sexism Index and Black in the last column of Table 4.  This too would be consistent with 
discrimination by employers if Black workers were in less competitive labor markets, allowing 
discrimination against Black women to be less costly.   
Taken together, the results in Table 4 suggest that sexism has a larger effect on the wage 
gap in circumstances in which discrimination is less costly or potentially more beneficial to the 
firm.  While this is not direct proof that the sexism of a media market generates discrimination in 
                                                          
17 We do not find evidence of a similar interaction for the broader category of non-white 
workers. 
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the labor market, these findings are consistent with discrimination by both employers and 
customers. 
4.2 Instrumental Variables Estimation 
While the estimates in Table 4 are suggestive of sexism causing discriminatory behavior and 
exacerbating wage gaps, they do not present clear evidence of a causal link.  One issue of 
concern is that women who are more productive may move to areas with less sexism and higher 
wages for women.  This would generate a bias in the coefficient of Sexism Index in our 
estimations.   
 To address this issue, we employ an instrumental variables strategy, using two 
instruments for the sexism of a media market:  the sexism of the closest media market and the 
mean sexism of all remaining media markets, weighted by the inverse of the distance to the 
original media market. Both of these instruments should be related to the sexism in a media 
market, but should be independent of the wages of women in that media market. We present 
results of this estimation in the first two columns of Table 5.  Both the Sargan-Hansen p-values 
and the F-statistics for the first stage suggest that these are valid instruments.  (First stage results 
are available in Appendix E.)  The coefficients of Sexism Index remain positive and significant in 
the second stage results presented in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5, confirming the conclusions 
that we drew with the cross-sectional study.  Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the 
coefficients increased in size in the IV estimations, reducing concerns about potential bias 
discussed above in the cross-sectional results. 
 Finally, although the estimations in the first two columns of Table 5 pass the usual tests 
for instrument validity, we still consider a potential threat to validity that may result from 
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spillover of economic conditions between media markets that might affect wages. We note that it 
is more likely for spillover effects to cause spatial correlation in the level of wages rather than 
spatial correlation in the wage gap. Nevertheless, we address this concern in two ways.  First, in 
the estimations reported in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5, we exclude from the instrument set the 
sexism of any media market within 100 miles in the first stage estimation.  Although the 
resulting coefficients are similar to those in Columns 1 and 2, the first stage F statistics are 
lower, suggesting that this set of instruments is weak.  As a result of that concern, we adopt a 
second strategy by returning to the baseline model in Columns 1 and 2 but explicitly controlling 
for the wage gap of nearby media markets in the second stage (Columns 5 and 6).  These results 
are also consistent with our previous results, suggesting a stronger causal role for sexism in 
determining the gender wage gaps that exist at the media market level. 
4.3 Panel Data Estimation 
Another concern about cross-sectional estimates is that there may be omitted characteristics of 
the media markets, correlated with sexism, that are responsible for the results we obtain.  To 
address that concern, we present our main results estimated with a fixed effects model using 
panel data in Table 6.   
These estimations include both a year and a media market fixed effect.  We use the same 
set of control variables as used in the cross-section estimation, but in the panel, all data is at the 
annual frequency.  The interpretation of these results is slightly different because they represent 
the impact of annual changes in sexism on annual changes in the wage gap within a media 
market.  Thus, while the cross-sectional results may capture longer term impacts, these results 
capture the way in which annual changes are correlated contemporaneously.  As such, the 
coefficients in all six panel specifications are smaller than the cross-sectional results, but are still 
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positive and statistically significant.  Overall, we conclude from this exercise that the 
relationship between sexism and the wage gap is robust to the inclusion of media market and 
year fixed effects, reducing the concern that it is being driven by omitted variables. 
5 Social Outcomes and Indirect Effects of Sexism 
While the results presented earlier show a significant direct effect of sexism on the wage gap, we 
also note that we found that several social outcomes (Women Married, Children, and Home 
Hours Gap) also are positively correlated with the wage gap as well.  When we control for these 
social outcomes in our main estimations, the magnitude of the direct effect of sexism gets 
smaller, indicating that sexism is correlated with these social outcomes.  This suggests that social 
outcomes may be an indirect channel for sexism to impact the wage gap.  In this section, we 
explore that channel and ultimately allow for simultaneous estimation of the gender wage gap 
and multiple social outcomes. 
5.1 IV Estimation 
As we explore the relationship between the sexism of an area and the gendered social outcomes 
of these areas, we are aware that these relationships may also be endogenous and adopt an 
instrumental variables strategy for this estimation as well.  Women with different social 
outcomes may sort into areas with higher or lower wage gaps or different levels of sexism.  In 
our previous estimations, we used an instrument based on spatial correlation of sexism.  While 
we also were able to obtain consistent statistically significant results with an instrument based on 
spatial correlation for social outcomes, the instrument turns out to be relatively weak, and we 
pursue an alternative strategy. 
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As the instrument for social outcomes, we use the average social outcomes of the birth 
state.  The first stage results are in Appendix E and show that this is a relatively strong 
instrument for social outcomes at the birth state-media market level.  The logic driving the birth 
state as an instrument is that it is independent from sorting because individuals do not choose 
their birthplace. A concern, however, is that outcomes in the birth state directly influence the 
wages of women still living in the state. We argue that the threat posed by this possibility is 
small, but we address remaining concerns by controlling for both the average wage gap and 
average sexism of the birth state.   
We are able to include the averages of the birth state because we estimate the wage gap at 
the birth state-media market level.  A final point is that this specification is no longer at the 
media market level. We construct a dataset where, instead of each observation representing a 
media market, each observation represents all individuals born in a state b and currently living in 
a media market d. We use the average social outcomes of the state b to instrument for the social 
outcomes of women born in b and currently living in d. 
Results of the second stage estimation of the wage gaps and social outcomes via the IV 
strategy appear in Table 7. In all these estimations, we instrument for both sexism and the social 
outcome.  The p-values on the Sargan-Hansen test and the F-statistics for the first stage 
estimations suggest that our IV strategy is valid.   Focusing first on the first two columns of 
Table 7, we see that sexism has a positive impact on the social outcome of marriage (column 2) 
and that the proportion of women that are married has a positive impact on the wage gap.  The 
estimations in these two columns show both a direct and indirect effect of sexism.  Specifically, 
the calculations at the bottom of Table 7 reveal that the indirect effect of sexism through its 
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impact on the proportion of women married is 1.74 cents.18  In other words, if the average media 
market had the lowest level of sexism, fewer women would be married and the effect of that 
lower marriage rate would close the gender wage gap by 1.74 cents.  The largest magnitude of an 
indirect effect of sexism is via its impact on the Home Hours Gap (columns 5 and 6 of Table 7). 
If the average media market had the lowest level of sexism, the effect on the Home Hours Gap 
would close the gender wage gap by 3.21 cents.  We do not find similarly strong effects for 
Children (columns 3 and 4 of Table 7).  When the instrumental variables strategy is used, 
Children is no longer significantly related to the wage gap and we do not pursue further analysis 
with it.   
5.2 Simultaneous Equation Models 
The results in Table 7 are from relationships estimated separately.  But, the underlying 
mechanisms are occurring simultaneously and it is most appropriate to estimate relationships 
between sexism, social outcomes, and wage gaps simultaneously.  In other words, we estimate a 
model in which sexism has a direct effect on the wage gap and an indirect effect via its effect on 
the social outcomes, which themselves affect the wage gap.  These relationships are described 
below.  
 Wage Gapbd = β0 + β1Sexism Indexd + β2Women Marriedbd + β3Home Hours Gapbd + β4Zbd + μbd 
(3)          Women Marriedbd = γ0 +  γ1Sexism Indexd + γ2Wage Gapbd + γ3Zbd + εbd 
Home Hours Gapbd = θ0 + θ1Sexism Indexd + θ2Wage Gapbd + θ3Women Marriedbd + θ4Zbd + ζbd 
                                                          
18 Using the coefficients reported in columns 1 and 2, the relevant calculation is 𝑆𝑆−.218+4.408(.187)(.026) − 𝑆𝑆−.218, multiplied by 100. 
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As before, Z represents socioeconomic characteristics of the media market used as control 
variables.  The subscript b denotes birth state and d the media market of residence. 
We estimate this via the iterative GMM estimator, treating sexism and social outcomes as 
endogenous variables and using as instruments the same variables from our earlier estimations, 
an instrument for sexism based on spatial correlation and an instrument for social outcomes 
based on the social outcomes of the birth state.  As mentioned above, we no longer include 
Children in our estimations because we did not find that it is robustly related to the wage gap. 
 This procedure yields interesting conclusions presented in Table 8.  The positive and 
significant coefficient on Sexism Index in all three estimations indicates that the sexism of a 
geographic area is directly related to the wage gap and to the social outcomes.  In addition, the 
fact that the proportion of women married is positively related to the Home Hours Gap (column 
3) indicates that marriage influences the amount of hours women work outside the home.  Thus, 
when we consider all the ways in which sexism can affect the wage gap, our results suggest that 
one channel is via the social outcome of Women Married, which affects the Home Hours Gap, 
which impacts the gender wage gap.  Once we estimate these relationships simultaneously, we 
no longer find a direct effect of the proportion women who are married on the wage gap.  The 
proportion of women who are married only affects the wage gap via its impact on the Home 
Hours Gap. 
 The bottom of Table 8 tabulates the direct and indirect effects of sexism.  The direct 
effect still remains substantial at 5.68 cents.  But the indirect effect is also non-trivial.  Adding all 
the direct and indirect effects of sexism yields a cost of sexism of 8.12 cents on the hourly wage 
26 
 
gap, equivalent to 41.42 percent of the wage gap.  In other words, if the average media market 
had the lowest level of sexism, the residual wage gap in that media market would close by 8.12 
cents. 
6 Additional interpretation 
6.1 The impact of sexism on male and female wage 
We have argued that sexism affects wages of women directly via discrimination and indirectly 
via influencing social outcomes of women which then impact labor market behavior.  If we are 
correct, then the impact of sexism should make female wages lower and should either have no 
effect on male wages or make them higher. To explore this idea, we estimate the impact of 
sexism on both parts of the wage gap, the coefficient on the female media market fixed effect 
(female wages) and the coefficient on the male media market fixed effect (male wages).  In each 
estimation, we include the coefficient on the media market fixed effect of the other gender as an 
independent variable to control for the fact that wages overall in some media markets are higher.  
 The results appear in Table 9.  Panel A shows the results in which the coefficient on the 
female media market effect is the dependent variable and Panel B shows the results in which the 
coefficient on the male media market fixed effect is the dependent variable.  Essentially, this 
approach allows us to understand better the ways in which sexism of an area affects the wage 
gap by examining separately the two components of the wage gap.  Examining first the results in 
Panel A, we see that, as expected, the male wage is highly positively correlated with the female 
wage in the same media market, but the sexism of that media market is also a significant and 
negative predictor of the female wage in all specifications.   
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Interestingly, when we examine the male wage in Panel B, to the extent that we find any 
statistically significant effect, it is positive.  The coefficient on sexism is not statistically 
significant in all estimations, but when it is, it suggests that sexism increases the wages of men.  
In total, these results are consistent with our interpretations above that the sexism of an area 
increases the gender wage gap. 
6.2 Considering alternative explanations 
In this section, we briefly consider two diametrically opposed alternative explanations for our 
results.  First, we note that some religious beliefs are associated with sexism, though, arguably a 
more benevolent sexism than what we identify in our index.  However, to determine if our index 
actually proxies for religion, we constructed another Google search index from Stephens-
Davidowitz (2014), based on the searches for “God.”  When we enter that as an additional 
control variable in our estimations, we find that it does not substantially change the coefficient of 
Sexism Index and does not enter the estimations in a statistically significant way, suggesting that 
our index of hostile sexism does not proxy for religious beliefs.  (See Columns 1 and 2 of 
Appendix Table F.) 
Another possibility is that because our index measures hostility towards women, we 
consider that the index may be picking up hostility in general.  In other words, in some media 
markets, individuals may simply express themselves on the Internet with greater hostility to both 
men and women.  To determine if this is driving our results, we construct two indices that might 
capture general “hostility searches.”  The first one is a male sexism index.  In other words, we 
remove the four original words from our sexism dictionary and replace “girl(s)” with “boy(s)” 
and “woman(en)” with “man(en).”  Although all the words in our dictionary do not have obvious 
male corollaries and the search volumes of the remaining male counterparts are significantly 
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lower, we are still able to follow the same procedures and construct a male sexism index.  We 
enter that into our estimations as a control variable and find that it does not enter significantly 
nor does it substantially affect the results for the original Sexism Index.  (See Columns 3 and 4 of 
Appendix Table F.)  Similarly, we construct a different index that is based solely on Google 
searches for definitions and meanings of the words in our dictionary.  That also enters our 
estimations insignificantly and does not alter our main results.  (See Columns 5 and 6 of 
Appendix Table F.)  Taken together, these results suggest that variation in general hostility 
expressed on the Internet is not responsible for the association between sexism and the wage gap 
that we document in this paper. 
7 Conclusion 
We find strong causal evidence that sexism affects the gender wage gap in a meaningful way.  It 
has a direct effect on the wage gap, which is consistent with labor market discrimination.  In 
addition, we identify a channel through which it has an indirect effect by influencing social 
outcomes that impact labor market behavior.  Interestingly, we find that sexism has a smaller 
effect in circumstances that would make discrimination more costly.  In particular, we do not 
find evidence that sexism affects the wages of college-educated workers. 
 The magnitude of the impact is important:  our estimates suggest that the average media 
market has an hourly wage gap that is 8.12 cents higher that it would be if it had the level of 
sexism of the least sexist area.  A reduction of sexism of this magnitude would reduce the 
residual wage gap by 41 percent. 
 Our work suggests multiple channels through which cultural attributes of an area can 
affect economic outcomes.  Necessarily, our study focuses only on one type of attitude, hostile 
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sexism, and a limited number of economic outcomes.  Expanding both the types of cultural 
attributes and the economic outcomes they may influence is a fruitful area for further research. 
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Table 1 Sexism Dictionary 
Women as objects 
 [word 1](s) 
 [word 3](s) 
 [word 4](s) 
 fat girl(s) 
 fat woman(en) 
 ugly girl(s) 
 ugly woman(en) 
 
Women as dumb and emotional 
  stupid girl(s) 
  stupid woman(en) 
  dumb girl(s) 
  dumb woman(en) 
  emotional girl(s) 
  emotional woman(en) 
 
 Women as rude and evil 
  [word 2](es)   
  cheating woman(en) 
  cheating girl(s) 
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Figure 1A 
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Figure 1B 
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Table 2, Panel A: Cross-sectional Summary Statistics  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent Variable      
Wage Gap 174 0.222 0.0344 0.148 0.387 
      
Explanatory Variable      
Sexism Index 174 0.000 1.000 -4.408 3.037 
%Women Married 174 0.659 0.0331 0.578 0.767 
Children 174 0.647 0.0648 0.425 0.767 
Home Hours Gap 174 6.258 0.985 3.926 10.27 
      
Control Variables      
%Employed 174 0.750 0.0406 0.646 0.858 
%Female Employed 174 0.692 0.0493 0.559 0.826 
LFP 174 0.787 0.0356 0.702 0.876 
Female LFP 174 0.725 0.0452 0.624 0.838 
College Gap 174 -0.0211 0.0200 -0.104 0.0544 
Notes: Each observation is a media market 
Table 2, Panel B: Panel Summary Statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent Variable      
Wage Gap 2,144 0.220 0.0470 0.0668 0.482 
      
Explanatory Variable      
Sexism Index 2,118 0.000 1.000 -2.744 4.318 
%Women Married 2,144 0.660 0.0397 0.519 0.794 
Children 2,144 0.648 0.0726 0.382 0.869 
Home Hours Gap 2,144 6.259 1.244 1.409 12.87 
      
Control Variables      
%Employed 2,144 0.749 0.0435 0.593 0.883 
%Female Employed 2,144 0.690 0.0530 0.511 0.871 
LFP 2,144 0.788 0.0375 0.658 0.897 
Female LFP 2,144 0.724 0.0485 0.572 0.871 
College Gap 2,144 -0.0190 0.0308 -0.145 0.0807 
Notes: Each observation is a media market in a year. 
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Table 2, Panel C: Summary Statistics for Instrumental Variables Estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent Variable      
Wage Gap 7,433 0.218 0.270 -2.579 4.176 
      
Instruments      
Sexism of closest media market 7,433 -0.0162 1.085 -4.408 3.037 
Sexism of remaining (weighted) 7,433 0.0581 0.136 -0.307 0.317 
%Women Married (birth) 7,433 0.643 0.0288 0.576 0.726 
Children (birth) 7,433 0.573 0.0422 0.471 0.706 
Home Hours Gap (birth) 7,433 6.000 0.572 4.516 8.845 
      
Explanatory Variable      
Sexism Index 7,433 -0.0920 1.012 -4.408 3.037 
%Women Married 7,433 0.664 0.129 0 1 
Children 7,219 0.595 0.210 0 1 
Home Hours Gap 7,433 6.447 5.069 -60 60.50 
      
Control Variables      
%Employed 7,433 0.756 0.0872 0.222 1 
%Female Employed 7,433 0.693 0.122 0 1 
LFP 7,433 0.791 0.0820 0.222 1 
Female LFP 7,433 0.724 0.118 0 1 
College Gap 7,433 0.00209 0.179 -1 1 
Notes: Each observation is a pair composed of a birth state and a media market of residence.
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Figure 2: Geographic Variation in the Residual Wage Gap 
 
Notes: Darker areas signify a wider wage gap. White areas signify areas without data.
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Table 3. Cross-sectional Estimates of the Impact of Sexism. 
 
 Dependent Variable:  Residual Wage Gap 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sexism Index 0.00875*** 0.00981*** 0.00524** 0.00611* 0.00658*** 
 (0.00244) (0.00229) (0.00220) (0.00313) (0.00196) 
Women Married   0.380***   
   (0.0854)   
Children    0.140***  
    (0.0490)  
Home Hours Gap     0.0145*** 
     (0.00241) 
%Employed 0.733* -3.154*** -2.445*** -2.778*** -1.549 
 (0.424) (0.934) (0.882) (0.881) (0.947) 
LFP -0.836 4.441*** 3.267*** 4.037*** 2.137* 
 (0.535) (1.149) (1.093) (1.115) (1.193) 
%Female Employ.  3.942*** 2.524** 3.307*** 2.024** 
  (0.933) (1.066) (0.908) (0.994) 
Female LFP  -5.134*** -3.373*** -4.378*** -2.634** 
  (1.112) (1.252) (1.097) (1.192) 
College Gap 0.250 -0.275 -0.273 -0.251 -0.0553 
 (0.151) (0.213) (0.222) (0.214) (0.202) 
Observations 174 174 174 174 174 
R-squared 0.172 0.319 0.410 0.372 0.447 
Change in the Impact of Sexism ∆ in coefficient from Col. 2   -0.00458*** -0.00370** -0.00324*** 
   (0.000988) (0.00162) (0.00102) 
% change in magnitude   46.63 37.75 32.97 
Costs of Sexism 
      
In cents 3.15 3.54 1.87 2.19 2.36 
As % of wage gap 15.85 17.82 9.41 11 11.86 
Notes All specifications are weighted by the inverse of the standard error of the wage gap. Standard errors are robust 
to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and within-state error correlation. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4. The Impact of Sexism by Group. 
 
 Dependent Variable: Residual Wage Gap  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sexism Index 0.0152*** 0.00567** 0.0147*** 0.00785*** 
 (0.00291) (0.00222) (0.00245) (0.00227) 
Sexism * College Educated -0.0154***    
 (0.00349)    
College Educated -0.0714***    
 (0.00704)    
Sexism * Manufacturing Industry  0.00981**   
  (0.00370)   
Sexism * Commerce Industry  0.00558***   
  (0.00195)   
Manufacturing Industry  0.0398***   
  (0.00424)   
Commerce Industry  0.0239***   
  (0.00344)   
Sexism * Diverse Industry   -0.00830***  
   (0.00270)  
Diverse Industry   -0.0330***  
   (0.00497)  
Sexism * Black    0.00855*** 
    (0.00293) 
Black    -0.0823*** 
    (0.00385) 
Observations 348 522 348 348 
R-squared 0.571 0.365 0.379 0.625 
Notes: All specifications control for %Employed, LFP, %Women employed, Female LFP, and College Gap. The 
wage gaps for each education or industry group are estimated separately and then stacked at the media market level. 
The variable Diverse Industry represents industries with a %Female above the median. All specifications are 
weighted by the inverse of the standard error of the wage gap. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary 
heteroscedasticity and within-state error correlation. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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Table 5: Cross-sectional, IV Estimates of the Impact of Sexism on the Wage Gap 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  Economic outcomes include %Employed and LFP. Female economic outcomes include %Female Employed and Female LFP. As two instruments for a 
media market’s sexism, we use the sexism of the closest media market and the average sexism of all other media markets, weighted by the inverse of the 
distance. Columns 3 and 4 account for potential spillover by excluding media markets within 100 miles from the instruments. Columns 5 and 6 control for the 
wage gap of the closest media market and for the average wage gap of all other media markets, weighted by the inverse of the distance. All specifications are 
weighted by the inverse of the standard error of the wage gap. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
 Dependent Variable: Residual Wage Gap 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sexism Index 0.0155*** 0.0185*** 0.0161** 0.0224*** 0.00858** 0.0123*** 
 (0.00574) (0.00496) (0.00791) (0.00864) (0.00416) (0.00410) 
       
Specification Baseline Exclude areas within 100 mi Control for nearby wage gaps 
       
Hansen P-value .98 .43 .86 .37 .16 .12 
F-statistic (1st stage) 14.31 12.17 6.74 5.71 17.57 13.39 
       
Observations 174 174 174 174 174 174 
R-squared 0.126 0.244 0.118 0.161 0.336 0.381 
       
Controls       
College Gap X X X X X X 
Econ. Outcomes X X X X X X 
Fem. Econ. Outcomes  X  X  X 
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Table 6: Panel Specification 
 Dependent Variable:  Residual Wage Gap 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sexism 0.00307* 0.00282* 0.00275* 0.00281* 0.00280* 
 (0.00162) (0.00153) (0.00156) (0.00151) (0.00152) 
Women married   0.0788   
   (0.0600)   
Children    0.00431  
    (0.0365)  
Home Hours Gap     0.00131 
     (0.00145) 
%Employed 0.222** 0.00846 -0.00361 0.00807 -0.0216 
 (0.0833) (0.170) (0.166) (0.171) (0.174) 
LFP -0.152 0.546** 0.532** 0.546** 0.566** 
 (0.106) (0.206) (0.205) (0.206) (0.210) 
Female LFP  -0.626*** -0.609*** -0.626*** -0.635*** 
  (0.167) (0.169) (0.167) (0.170) 
%Women employed  0.222 0.226 0.223 0.244 
  (0.164) (0.163) (0.169) (0.170) 
College Gap -0.0128 -0.0259 -0.0230 -0.0260 -0.0280 
 (0.0372) (0.0358) (0.0357) (0.0359) (0.0355) 
Media market & Year FE X X X X X 
Observations 2,118 2,118 2,118 2,118 2,118 
R-squared 0.561 0.567 0.567 0.567 0.567 
Notes: Each observation is a media market in a year. All specifications are weighted by the inverse of the standard 
error of the wage gap. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and error correlation within a state. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: 2SLS Estimates of the Indirect Effect of Sexism 
 
Dependent variables: Resid. Wage gap Women Married Resid. Wage Gap Children Resid. Wage Gap Home Hours Gap 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sexism Index 0.0201*** 0.0260*** 0.0244*** 0.0307* 0.0163*** 0.458*** 
 (0.00580) (0.00761) (0.00612) (0.0181) (0.00428) (0.164) 
Women Married 0.187***      
 (0.0725)      
Children   0.00811    
   (0.0766)    
Home Hours Gap     0.0194***  
     (0.00693)  
Observations 7,433 7,433 7,219 7,219 7,433 7,433 
R-squared 0.008 0.058 0.002 0.170 -0.129 0.044 
Sargan-Hansen P-value .77 .5 .86 .99 .99 .82 
F-statistic (1st stage) 100.03 35.38 23.46 35.32 18.53 35.38 
Indirect costs of Sexism 
Via Women Married 1.74 cents  Responsible for 19 percent of the total impact of sexism 
Via Children .09 cents  Responsible for 0.96 percent of the total impact of sexism 
Via Home Hours Gap 3.21 cents  Responsible for 35 percent of the total impact of sexism 
Notes: All specifications control for %Employed, LFP, %Women employed, Female LFP, and College Gap. The instruments for sexism are the sexism of the 
closest media market and the average sexism of all other media markets, weighted by the inverse distance. The instrument for a social outcome is the average 
social outcome of the birth state. All specifications are weighted by the inverse of the standard error of the wage gap. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary 
heteroscedasticity and within-state error correlation. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 8: GMM Estimates. Marriage and Home Hours Difference Together. 
Dependent variable Residual wage gap Women Married Home Hours Gap 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Sexism Index 0.0155*** 0.0209*** 0.279** 
 (0.00398) (0.00615) (0.128) 
Women Married 0.0668  7.826*** 
 (0.0752)  (1.770) 
Home Hours Gap 0.0154**   
 (0.00597)   
Residual Wage Gap  0.0206** -0.513* 
  (0.00836) (0.274) 
Origin Wage Gap 0.371*** -0.00312 2.248*** 
 (0.0596) (0.0348) (0.864) 
%Employed -0.126 0.455*** 7.799*** 
 (0.179) (0.106) (2.700) 
LFP 0.237 0.00207 3.827 
 (0.208) (0.103) (2.599) 
%Female Employ. 0.125 0.110* -7.252*** 
 (0.116) (0.0661) (1.464) 
Female LFP -0.163 -0.493*** -1.819 
 (0.124) (0.0754) (1.723) 
College Gap -0.00261 -0.00180 2.174*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0128) (0.426) 
Observations 7,433 7,433 7,433 
   
Sargan-Hansen P-value .796 
Costs of sexism 
Direct effect of sexism 5.68 cents 29 percent  
Indirect effect via Home Hours Gap 1.54 cents 7.84 percent  
Indirect effect via Women Married and Hhrs. .9 cents 4.58 percent  
Total indirect effect 2.44 cents 12.42 percent  
Total net effect (direct + indirect) 8.12 cents 41.42 percent  
Indirect effect as a % of total effect 30 percent 
Notes: We use the iterative GMM estimator. The instruments for sexism are the sexism of the closest media market 
and the average sexism of all other media markets, weighted by the inverse distance. The instrument for a social 
outcome is the average social outcome of the birth state. All specifications are weighted by the inverse of the 
standard error of the wage gap. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and within-state error 
correlation. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 9: Cross-sectional, OLS Estimates of the Impact of Sexism on Female and Male Wage 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Impact of sexism on female wage      
Sexism Index -0.0119*** -0.0124*** -0.00777*** -0.00700*** -0.00897*** 
 (0.00226) (0.00237) (0.00189) (0.00214) (0.00193) 
Male wage 0.846*** 0.898*** 0.885*** 0.794*** 0.902*** 
 (0.0627) (0.0563) (0.0465) (0.0557) (0.0515) 
Observations 173 173 173 173 173 
R-squared 0.902 0.914 0.926 0.936 0.927 
      
Panel B: Impact of sexism on male wage      
Sexism Index 0.00651* 0.00772* 0.00446 0.00573 0.00522 
 (0.00362) (0.00421) (0.00317) (0.00427) (0.00351) 
Female wage 0.941*** 0.904*** 0.936*** 0.991*** 0.928*** 
 (0.0546) (0.0516) (0.0471) (0.0448) (0.0492) 
Observations 173 173 173 173 173 
R-squared 0.875 0.901 0.911 0.909 0.914 
      
Controls      
College Gap X X X X X 
Economic Outcomes X X X X X 
Female Economic Outcomes  X X X X 
Women Married   X   
Children    X  
Home Hours Gap     X 
Notes: Economic outcomes include %Employed and LFP. Female economic outcomes include %Female Employed and Female LFP. Female Wage is defined as 
the coefficient on the female media market fixed effect. Male wage is defined as the coefficient on the male media market fixed effect. All specifications are 
weighted by the inverse of the standard error of either Female Wage or Male Wage. All standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and error 
correlation within a state. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix A: Construction of the Sexism Index 
Coding for Offensive Language 
Word Code in text 
cunt 
bitch 
slut 
whore 
word 1 
word 2 
word 3 
word 4 
 
Additional Technical Details  
We use Google Trends to obtain the relative search volume of phrases in our sexism dictionary. 
Google Trends returns an index based on the relative search volume of specific searches within a 
media market such that the media market that has the highest relative search volume receives a 
100.  Google Trends returns a value of 0 if the absolute search volume of a word falls below an 
unknown but very low privacy threshold. We employ an algorithm from Stephens-Davidowitz 
(2014) to address this. For each word “x”, we download 300 samples of “x”, “weather”, and 
“weather + x”, dropping any values of “x” and “weather” that are either 0 or 100. Then, we 
impute the missing values of “x” by regressing the non-missing values of “x” on “weather” and 
“weather + x”. To aggregate the samples, we take the average across all 300 imputations.  
Sexism Index summarizes the 2004-2019 search volumes of 16 phrases in our sexism 
dictionary. To construct it, we conduct a principal components analysis on the Google Trends 
index based on relative search volumes.  The index is defined as the sum of all principal 
components with eigenvalue over one, weighted by eigenvalue.  To ease interpretation, we 
normalize the resulting values of the index for each media market by subtracting the index by its 
mean and dividing by its standard deviation.  
Out of 16 principal components, only the first four have eigenvalues over one, explaining 
83 percent of total variation. Through principal component analysis, Sexism Index should give 
heavier weight to phrases more related to sexism, reducing the impact of variation unrelated to 
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sexism. The normalization of the Sexism Index implies that it has a mean of zero and standard 
deviation of one. The final variable measures the number of standard deviations an area’s sexist 
search volume is from the mean. 
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Individual characteristics  
   Age Quartic A quartic polynomial for the current age of an individual in years. 
  
   Schooling FE A set of dummy variables for each year of schooling.19 
   Industry FE A set of dummy variable for each of the 300 census industry classifications in our sample. 
  
   Occupation Type FE A set of dummy variable for the four occupation categories: management and business, science, service, 
and manufacturing. Constructed manually using 2010 census classifications.  
  
Media Market Social Outcomes 
   Women Married The percent of white women between the ages of 25 and 64 currently married in a media market. 
  
   Children The percent of white women between the ages of 25 and 40 with at least one child at home in a media 
market.20 
  
   Home Hours Gap The average home hours of white women between the ages of 25 and 64 minus the average home hours of 
white men between the ages of 25 and 64 in a media market.21 
  
Media Market Socioeconomic Controls  
  
   %Employed The percent of whites between the ages of 25 and 64 currently employed in a media market. 
  
   %Female Employed The percent of white women between the ages of 25 and 64 currently employed in a media market. 
  
   LFP The percent of whites between the ages of 25 and 64 participating in the labor force in a media market. 
  
   Female LFP The percent of white women between the ages of 25 and 64 participating in the labor force in a media 
market. 
  
   College Gap The percent of white men between the ages of 25 and 64 with a college education minus the percent of 
white women between the ages of 25 and 64 with a college education in a media market  
  
                                                          
19 Since the ACS does not include a literal “years of education” variable, we impute it using the midpoint of each 
category. 
20 Restricting the sample to women younger than 40 maximizes the probability that a woman’s eldest child is still at 
home. 
21 Because the ACS does not include an explicit variable for “home hours”, we construct it by subtracting usual 
hours worked per week from 168, the total number of hours in a week. 
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Appendix C: Ranking of Residual Wage Ratios 
Media markets with the 10 smallest gaps Ratio Media markets with the 10 largest gaps Ratio  
Gainesville FL 86.23872 Lake Charles LA 67.94209  
Burlington VT-Plattsburgh NY 86.16167 Beaumont-Port Arthur TX 70.42979  
Lexington KY 86.02189 Idaho Falls-Pocatello ID 72.61327  
Harlingen-Weslaco-Brownsville-McAllen TX 85.05079 Baton Rouge LA 72.87431  
Rochester MN-Mason City IA-Austin MN 84.84537 Lafayette LA 73.42238  
Greenville-New Bern-Washington NC 84.81471 Corpus Christi TX 75.58092  
Charlottesville VA 84.30365 Evansville IN 75.60896  
Washington DC (Hagerstown MD) 84.29196 Odessa-Midland TX 75.90942  
Eureka CA 84.11975 Huntsville-Decatur (Florence) AL 75.98314  
Tallahassee FL-Thomasville GA 83.85233 Peoria-Bloomington IL 76.29172  
Notes: Wage ratios are adjusted by individual characteristics. 
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Appendix D:  Individual Level Results 
 
 Residualized log wages 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
Female dummy -0.164*** -0.163*** 
 (0.00310) (0.00330) 
Sexism -0.0345*** -0.0267*** 
 (0.0110) (0.00900) 
Sexism * Female -0.00629*** -0.00566*** 
 (0.00168) (0.00190) 
% Employed 0.0322*** 0.0341*** 
 (0.00437) (0.00475) 
LFP 1.022** 3.581*** 
 (0.412) (0.591) 
%Women employed  -6.920*** 
  (0.834) 
Female LFP  5.291*** 
  (0.946) 
College gap 0.584 -0.847 
 (0.641) (0.656) 
Observations 7,542,754 7,542,754 
R-squared 0.028 0.034 
Notes: The dependent variable is log wages, residualized by a quartic for age and fixed effects for year, years of 
schooling, industry, and occupation type. All specifications are weighted by the inverse of this residual. All standard 
errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and within-state error correlation. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix E:  First Stage Results 
 
1st stage dependent variable Sexism Women Ma. Sexism Sexism Children Sexism Sexism Hhrs. Gap. Sexism 
2nd stage dependent variable Wage Gap Wage Gap Women Ma. Wage Gap Wage Gap Children Wage Gap Wage Gap Hhr Gap 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Instruments          
Sexism of closest media market 0.214*** 0.00302 0.212*** 0.213*** 0.00593 0.211*** 0.214*** 0.110* 0.212*** 
 (0.0645) (0.00216) (0.0647) (0.0647) (0.00553) (0.0650) (0.0647) (0.0577) (0.0647) 
Average (weighted) sexism of remaining 2.528*** 0.0721*** 2.507*** 2.550*** 0.0811 2.526*** 2.532*** 1.018* 2.507*** 
 (0.401) (0.0253) (0.405) (0.402) (0.0766) (0.406) (0.398) (0.591) (0.405) 
Women Married of birth state 0.0517 0.588***        
 (0.390) (0.0328)        
Children of birth state    0.420 0.522***     
    (0.437) (0.0559)     
Home hours of birth state       -0.0572** 0.475***  
       (0.0269) (0.0711)  
Control variables          
%Employed -2.854 0.259*** -2.862 -2.808 -0.122 -2.791 -2.771 9.974*** -2.862 
 (2.097) (0.0910) (2.074) (2.182) (0.151) (2.188) (2.082) (2.729) (2.074) 
LFP -4.258** 0.0518 -4.327*** -4.535** -0.329* -4.621*** -4.300*** 1.928 -4.327*** 
 (1.665) (0.104) (1.610) (1.813) (0.185) (1.776) (1.640) (2.743) (1.610) 
%Female employed -0.424 0.107 -0.428 -0.592 0.0159 -0.571 -0.397 -6.656*** -0.428 
 (0.665) (0.0674) (0.659) (0.738) (0.130) (0.723) (0.664) (1.682) (0.659) 
Female LFP 1.175 -0.454*** 1.258 1.370 -0.254** 1.396 1.082 -4.369** 1.258 
 (0.853) (0.0752) (0.844) (0.937) (0.128) (0.946) (0.842) (2.046) (0.844) 
College difference 0.0250 -0.0159 0.0147 0.0271 0.0393 0.0254 0.0600 1.805*** 0.0147 
 (0.156) (0.0137) (0.156) (0.172) (0.0275) (0.172) (0.154) (0.482) (0.156) 
Origin wage gap -0.462 0.0842*** -0.601 -0.480 -0.0178 -0.589 -0.376 1.004 -0.601 
 (0.411) (0.0326) (0.413) (0.405) (0.0534) (0.422) (0.390) (0.937) (0.413) 
Observations 7,433 7,433 7,433 7,219 7,219 7,219 7,433 7,433 7,433 
Notes: The results show the first stage of the 2SLS specification. The instruments for sexism are the sexism of the closest media market and the average sexism 
of all other media markets, weighted by the inverse distance. The instrument for a social outcome is the average social outcome of the birth state. All 
specifications are weighted by the inverse of the standard error of the wage gap. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and within-state error 
correlation. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix F:  Considering alternative explanations 
 Dependent Variable: Residual Wage Gap 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sexism Index 0.00689** 0.00817*** 0.0102** 0.0110*** 0.00897*** 0.00892*** 
 (0.00296) (0.00229) (0.00383) (0.00358) (0.00231) (0.00216) 
Searches for God 0.00521 0.00450     
 (0.00388) (0.00345)     
Male Sexism Index   -0.00163 -0.00132   
   (0.00444) (0.00377)   
Sexist Definitions Index     0.000833 -0.00380 
     (0.00367) (0.00317) 
% Employed 0.467 -3.667*** 0.733* -3.168*** 0.749 -3.191*** 
 (0.440) (0.867) (0.424) (0.943) (0.450) (0.926) 
LFP -0.515 4.974*** -0.831 4.458*** -0.852 4.600*** 
 (0.540) (1.067) (0.525) (1.163) (0.562) (1.076) 
% Female Employed  4.284***  3.959***  3.847*** 
  (0.859)  (0.950)  (1.005) 
Female LFP  -5.453***  -5.150***  -5.145*** 
  (1.021)  (1.128)  (1.142) 
College Difference 0.188 -0.302 0.244 -0.278 0.233 -0.261 
 (0.179) (0.211) (0.162) (0.218) (0.191) (0.224) 
Observations 174 174 174 174 174 174 
R-squared 0.183 0.326 0.173 0.319 0.173 0.329 
Notes: Searches for God is the search volume of “God”, normalized by Z-score. Male Sexism Index takes Sexism Index, removes the original four words, and 
replaces “girl(s)” with “boy(s)” and “man(en)” with “woman(en)”. Sexist Definitions Index adds “definition” and “meaning” to each entry in Sexism Index. All 
specifications are weighted by the inverse of the standard error of the wage gap. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and within-state error 
correlation. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
